A Methodology for Evaluating Security in Commercial RFID Systems by Fernández-Caramés, Tiago M. et al.
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
Chapter 4
A Methodology for Evaluating Security in Commercial
RFID Systems
Tiago M. Fernández-Caramés, Paula Fraga-Lamas,
Manuel Suárez-Albela and Luis Castedo
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/64844
Provisional chapter
A Methodology for Evaluating Security in Commercial
RFID Systems
Tiago M. Fernández-Caramés, Paula Fraga-Lamas,
Manuel Suárez-Albela and Luis Castedo
Additional information is available at the end of the chapter
Abstract
Although RFID has become a widespread technology, the developers of numerous
commercial systems have not taken care of security properly. This chapter presents a
methodology for detecting common security flaws. The methodology is put in practice
using an open-source RFID platform (Proxmark 3), and it is tested in different fields,
such as public transportation or animal identification. The results obtained show that
the consistent application of the methodology allows researchers to perform security
audits easily and detect, mitigate, or avoid risks and possible attacks.
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1. Introduction
In the last years, RFID has been applied throughout industry and services, thanks to its ease of
use and its multiple practical applications, including animal identification, access control,
passport verification,  transportation and payment cards,  car access control,  supply chain
traceability, logistics, or toll payments. However, despite becoming an everyday technology,
many public and private entities have not considered the security of RFID systems as a basic
requirement. In fact, it is easy to find many commercial systems that contain critical security
flaws and vulnerabilities [1, 2] that allow for cloning tags or for straight signal replaying. Such
vulnerabilities let attackers access certain services or facilities, get or alter personal information,
and even track people.
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Fortunately, secure mechanisms can be applied to prevent the attacks aforementioned,
including the use of cryptography, the automatic detection of rogue devices [3], the enhance-
ment of the resistance to cloning [4], the secure storage of critical data in remote databases or
the use of secure physical modulations and medium access control (MAC) protocols. None-
theless, it is common to find commercial RFID systems that have such security features
disabled or detect already-broken RFID security systems still in use.
Taking the considerations previously mentioned into account, this chapter describes a
methodology that allows researchers to evaluate the most common security flaws and details
the necessary tools for applying such a methodology.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 first reviews the most common
security threats that can be used against RFID systems and then describes some of the latest
RFID hardware/software security tools available. Section 3 exposes the methodology proposed
for analyzing RFID security. In Section 4, the methodology is tested in different commercial
systems. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to conclusions.
2. Security in RFID
2.1. Basics on attacks against RFID systems
Information security has been classically governed by what is known as the CIA Triad:
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality is related to the importance of
protecting the most sensitive information from unauthorized access. Integrity consists in
protecting data from modification or deletion by unauthorized parties, and ensuring that when
authorized people make changes, they can be undone if some damage occurs. Finally, availa-
bility is the possibility of accessing the data when needed. If any of these three principles is
not met, then security can be said that it has been broken.
Like other technologies, RFID is exposed to security threats and, specifically, to attacks on the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data stored on the tags or on the information
exchanged between a reader and a tag.
The term risk refers to the probability of occurrence of an event that causes damage to an
informational asset. Two kinds of risks can be basically distinguished:
• Security risks. They are derived from actions able to damage, block, or take advantage from
a service in a malicious way. The action is usually carried out with the objective of obtaining
a profit or just for damaging the access to certain service. The most common services
provided by RFID systems are access control to facilities and payments.
• Privacy risks. These risks affect the confidential information of the users. RFID tags can store
data of the payments they performed or the transportation route followed by the user/
owner.
In real life, most risks are a mixture of both security and privacy risks: they threaten RFID
security in order to get access to the information stored or to the data related to a transaction.
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A classification of RFID attacks can be seen in [5]. The following are the most common attacks
associated with security risks:
• Tag isolation. It is technically the simplest attack and probably the most common. It consists
in blocking the tag communications to avoid sending data to the reader. It is usually carried
out by means of a Faraday cage or by jamming RF signals.
• Tag cloning. The unique identifier (UID) and/or the content of the RFID is extracted and
inserted into another tag [6]. Cloning is commonly used for accessing restricted areas or for
decreasing the price of certain goods in supermarkets.
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The reader is flooded with such a large amount of informa-
tion that it cannot deal with the signals sent by real tags [7]. Other techniques are based on
emitting radio noise at the operating frequency of the RFID system.
• Command injection. Some readers are vulnerable to remote code execution just by reading
the content of a tag [8].
• Signal replaying. It consists in recording the RFID signal in certain time instants with the
objective of replaying it later.
• Remote tag destruction. There exist RFID zappers that are able to send energy remotely that
once rectified, is so high that certain components of the tag might be burned. Researchers
have also found that it is possible to misuse the kill password in some tags (Electronic Product
Code(EPC) Class-1 Gen-2) with a passive eavesdropper and then disable the tags [9].
• SQL injection. Like in the case of command injection, it has been found that some reader
middleware is susceptible to the injection of random SQL commands [8].
• Virus/Malware injection. Although difficult to perform in the vast majority of RFID tags due
to their low storage capacity, it is possible in certain tags to insert malicious code that is able
to be transmitted to other tags [8].
• Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. They consist in placing an active device between a tag
and the reader in order to intercept and alter the communications between both elements
[10, 11].
• Relay/Amplification attacks. They consist in amplifying the RFID signal using a relay; thus,
the range of the RFID tag is extended beyond its intended use [12].
• RFID skimming. They consist in the use of portable point of sales terminals to make
unauthorized and fraudulent charges on payment cards.
Attacks associated with privacy risks include the following:
• Unauthorized access to personal data. Many systems store private data on the tag or transmit
them when a tag and reader exchange information.
• Personal tracking. This is probably the most feared, since an attacker might determine
routes, purchases, and habits of a specific person. The information may be even used for
marketing purposes.
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2.2. Hardware tools for auditing RFID security
In recent years, a number of projects have been developed with the aim of facilitating re-
searchers’ low-level access to RFID communications. Some of them are just software tools that
can be used with commercial RFID readers (RFIDiot [13]), while others involve specific
hardware (Proxmark 3 [14], Tastic [15], OpenPCD [16], OpenPICC [17], Chameleon Mini [18]),
or certain firmware (Proxbrute for Proxmark 3 [19]). Hardware developments are specially
interesting: some devices can emulate readers (Tastic, OpenPCD); others can emulate just tags
(OpenPICC); and a few can emulate both kinds of devices (Proxmark 3, Chameleon Mini).
There are not many academic platforms developed to test RFID security. An example can be
found in [20], where a microcontroller and Field-Programmable Gate-Array(FPGA)-based tag
platform is presented with the aim of evaluating high-frequency (HF) and ultra-high-frequen-
cy (UHF) RFID tags. The latest development as of writing is the Chameleon Mini, which has
been promoted by the Ruhr University (Bochum, Germany): it is a versatile RFID tag emulator
compliant with ISO/IEC 14443 and ISO/IEC 15693 (for instance, it currently supports MIFARE
Classic 1K/4K/Ultralight emulation).
The platform selected in this chapter to analyze RFID security was Proxmark 3, which is an
open-source system able to transmit at LF (125–134 KHz) and HF (13.56 MHz). The system
contains an Atmel AT91SAM7S256 (256 KB of flash and 64 KB of RAM), an FPGA (Xilinx
Spartan-II), and an 8-bit analog-to-digital converter (ADC). It is powered through an USB and
has a SV2 connector for the antenna, which contains four pins: two are for the HF antenna, and
the other two are for the LF antenna. All these components can be observed in Figure 1. Among
Proxmark features, it is relevant its ability to sniff the communications between a reader and
different tags, and the possibility of emulating a reader or a specific tag.
When the Proxmark acts as an RFID receiver, the signal that comes from the antenna goes
through the ADC and is converted from analog to digital. Then, the digital data are sent
through an 8-bit bus to the FPGA, where it is demodulated. Finally, the signal is sent from the
FPGA to the microcontroller through the Serial Peripheral Interface(SPI) to deal with the RFID
protocol. When the Proxmark acts as a transmitter, the same steps are performed but in reverse
Figure 1. Main components of Proxmark 3.
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order. The FPGA modulators/demodulators are developed in Verilog, while the Atmel
microcontroller is programmed in C.
3. A methodology for evaluating RFID security
3.1. Methodology proposed
In order to automate the evaluation of security in commercial RFID systems, a methodology
has been devised. A reduced flow diagram is depicted in Figure 2. It consists of the following
main steps: 
1. Visual inspection of the tag. Many tags include the name of manufacturer, the model and,
sometimes, the RFID standard. With such data, it is usually easy to get more specific
information on the way the tags behave and how to perform security tests.
Figure 2. Flow diagram of the methodology.
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2. Radio frequency detection. If there are no external signs on the tag, it is first recommended
to determine the tag’s frequency. In such a case, LF, HF, UHF, and super-high frequency
(SHF) tags can be found. There are software and hardware mechanisms to determine
which is the operating frequency, like using a spectrum analyzer, or disassembling the
tag or the reader to observe the hardware components of the radio interface.
3. Modulation and coding detection.
4. Standard identification. Once obtained the three previous parameters (frequency, modu-
lation, and coding), it is straightforward to determine whether there exists an RFID
standard compliant with such configuration. If it is not the case, the research could become
tricky, since it might involve a proprietary protocol. However, when working with LF, HF,
and UHF tags, standards are usually followed.
5. Sniff and emulate communications to perform security tests.
3.2. Applying the methodology with the Proxmark 3
The methodology presented in this chapter can be easily applied to any unknown HF and LF
RFID tags. In the next subsections, the analysis is divided into LF and HF tags, since the way
they work varies noticeably. As it will be detailed, it is possible to work at a physical level with
LF tags, but that is not easy in the case of HF devices.
3.2.1. Detecting the operating frequency
The first step of the methodology consists in obtaining the operation frequency. For such a
purpose, one of the antennas (LF or HF) has to be placed far from any tag and the Proxmark
command hw tune has to be executed. The command gives us the received voltage in the
different supported frequencies. Then, the operation has to be performed next to the unknown
tag: if one of the voltages has decreased remarkably for a specific frequency, it means that such
a frequency is the operating frequency.
Figures 3 and 4 show an example of the process for an LF tag. First, the voltages are checked
with the HF antenna connected (note in Figure 3 that the LF antenna is said to be unusable),
and it can be observed that they almost do not change between tests (i.e., just around 1 V).
When the same procedure is carried out with the LF antenna (Figure 4), the voltages associated
with LF frequencies drop substantially (especially of 134 KHz), and therefore, it is concluded
that the tag is indeed LF.
3.2.2. Analyzing LF tags
When determining whether a tag follows an LF standard, the first step consists in figuring out
the data modulation and coding. For such a purpose, the following sequence of Proxmark
commands has to be executed:
• LF read [h]: the tag is powered with the selected frequency (125 KHz by default, or 134 KHz
using the parameter h). The command also records the signal transmitted by the tag.
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• Data sample x: it downloads x of the previously recorded samples to the PC.
• Data plot: it allows the user to open a new window to plot the signal. It is useful for evaluating
the signal visually.
• Different instructions can be used to modify, amplify, decimate, or normalize signal values
to ease signal identification.
• If the signal is clean enough, and its modulation has been recognized, the user can try to
demodulate it. For instance, if the signal is modulated in amplitude-shift keying (ASK),
the command data askdemod can be executed. In the case of frequency-shift keying (FSK)
modulated signals, fskdemod is the right command.
Figure 3. HF voltages for an LF tag when is present (second command) or not in the field.
Figure 4. LF voltages when an LF tag is not in the field (first command) and when it is.
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Figure 5 shows an example of the signal obtained after carrying out the first three steps
previously mentioned. Such a signal can then be demodulated, as it seems to be modulated
either in ASK or FSK.
In this case, when the command askdemod was executed, it returned an error indicating that it
had not been detected an ASK-modulated signal, and in fact, taking a closer look at Figure 5
it can be observed that the period of the pulses with less amplitude is different from the others.
Therefore, it had to be FSK and fskdemod demodulated the signal (Figure 6).
Figure 5. Example of an LF tag signal received.
Figure 6. LF tag signal demodulated with fskdemod.
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The next step consists in searching for a bit pattern, which might lead to determine the length
of the identifier. Thus, the signal has to be observed during certain periods of time and look
for similarities. In order to understand the transmitted data, it can be useful to find the standard
that defines and structures them. For instance, in the previous example, the LF tag was an
access control card manufactured by HID [21], whose well-known LF data structures can be
extracted and then the UID obtained, as it is shown in Figure 7.
At this point, the HID tag can be emulated with the Proxmark using the command lf hid sim;
and it can even be cloned with a rewritable tag like Atmel T5557.
3.2.3. Analyzing HF tags
HF tags behave in a slightly different way than the LF ones: their signal is so fast that it cannot
be processed so easily at plain sight. Moreover, in general, HF tags are smarter than LF tags,
and they not only transmit an identifier repeatedly but also perform more complex commu-
nications with the reader. There exist many HF transmission modes and protocols. Further-
more, HF tags and readers can vary their modulation during the same transmission. For
example, a tag can send FSK-modulated data, while the reader responds in ASK.
The steps required to analyze HF tags are not as clear as in LF, so the study becomes more like
a trial-and-error process. For instance, the case of a public transportation card whose data were
decoded after trying one by one all the possible combinations defined by the most popular
standards until the right one was found is shown in Figure 8: first, it was tested ISO/IEC 14443-
A, then ISO/IEC 15693 and, finally, ISO/IEC 14443-B.
Figure 7. Obtaining the tag UID of an access control LF tag manufactured by HID.
Figure 8. Determining the RFID standard of an HF tag.
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The command for reading ISO/IEC 14443-B tags sends an Answer to Request Type B(ATQB)
command (0x05, 0x00, 0x08, 0x39, 0x73) and records the tag’s answer. The second value of the
output can be either 0x00000000 or 0x00000001: if it is “1”, it means the reply of the tag was
received properly. If it is “0”, it means that not all bytes (or none) were received.
In the specific case of the previous tag, the answer of the tag is “3 1 e,” so the second value
(“1”) means that the tag is actually compliant with ISO/IEC 14443-B. The Proxmark is able to
return the data after issuing the command hexsamples, which shows the UID and additional
control bytes (in Figure 9).
4. Practical evaluation
In order to validate the methodology proposed, three different commercial RFID systems were
analyzed and tested. The next subsections first introduce the tags audited and then give details
on the analysis and the steps required testing their security.
4.1. M and T cards
In this section, what we have called “M” and “T” cards are analyzed. Please note that such
aliases were given to avoid legal issues, since there are still several hundred thousand units of
the cards still in use.
In the case of the M card, it has been used in the last years by the city council of a relevant city
in Spain for paying different services such as public transportation, museum access, or sport
events. It is said that the council has sold more than 200,000 units of the card.
Regarding the T card, it is an RFID card developed by a Spanish regional government that
provides public transportation payment to a population of 2.7 million people. It was designed
to be compatible with the M card; therefore, in the next subsection a joint analysis of both cards
is performed.
4.1.1. Visual inspection
In plain sight, there are no signs or symbols that indicate the frequency band of the RFID cards.
It can be assumed that by the reading range and the amount of information stored, they could
be HF tags, but a deeper analysis should be performed to verify it accurately.
Figure 9. UID and control bytes from an ISO/IEC 14443-B compliant card.
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4.1.2. Operating frequency and modulation
• Radio frequency. Although both cards seem to be HF, the steps described in Section 3.2.1
have to be carried out to determine whether they are LF or HF. Such steps confirm that they
are HF tags.
• Modulation. Once the radio frequency is obtained, it has to be decided which of the possible
standards the tags follow, and then, the modulation can be determined. A first fast test
consisting in sending commands for ISO/IECs 14443-A, 14443-B, and 15693 standards show
that the tags only answer correctly to the ones issued following ISO/IEC 14443-B.
4.1.3. Understanding the underlying protocols
ISO/IEC 14443 [22] is a 13.56 MHz-based standard that defines proximity RFID systems that
are usually related to payment cards. ISO/IEC 14443 consists of four parts: (1) physical
characteristics, (2) RF power and signal interface, (3) initialization and anti-collision, and (4)
transmission protocol. It also defines two kinds of tags (type A and type B), which differ in
parts (2) and (3). Table 1 shows the differences in terms of modulation and coding between
both types [in such a table, the reader is called proximity coupling device (PCD), and the tag
is the proximity integrated circuit card (PICC)].
4.1.4. Security analysis
4.1.4.1. Obtaining communication traces
The first step for the security analysis consisted in obtaining a good set of data samples of the
communications carried out between each card and the reader. Note that data samples were
taken during real trips in public transportation. Thus, a laptop with the Proxmark was carried
in a backpack, while the RFID antenna cable was placed along the sleeve of a jacket until
reaching the tester’s hand, where the antenna captured the dialog between the card and the
reader.
Once the radio signals were captured by the antenna, they were demodulated and decoded
with the Proxmark. The main problem with this setup was electric noise: many samples were
Type A Type B
PCD to PICC ASK 100% ASK 10%
Modified Miller, 106 kbps NRZ, 106 kbps
PICC to PCD Load modulation Load modulation
Subcarrier fc/16 Subcarrier fc/16
OOK BPSK
Manchester, 106 kbps NRZ-L, 106 kbps
Table 1. Modulation and coding used by ISO/IECs 14443-A and 14443-B.
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lost because they became corrupted. In fact, none of the first 10 capturing attempts was
successful, and it was necessary to perform numerous tests and try three different M/T cards
to get a good data set. An example of captured data is shown in Table 2.
Timestamp RSSI Device Payload   Additional
information
0 142 TAG 50 08 10 2a 1d 53 4e 44 4b 33 81 93 bc 3f
1398 112 TAG 00 78 f0
854 05 00 00 71 ff
11500 05 00 00 71 ff
11478 06 00 97 5b
46342 05 00 08 39 73
1908 1d 08 10 2a 1d 00 08 01 00 94 60
554 296 TAG 00 78 f0
3566 02 80 26 4f 11 0a e7 de
3146 116 TAG 02 00 14 98 70 10 01 01 76 55 72 90 00 73 65
36188 03 80 32 00 00 18 ea 98
1852 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 **Fail CRC**
480 00 90 00 1d fe **Fail CRC**
3676 02 80 2e 01 00 20 43 2f
2870 203 TAG 02 01 01 e0 f5 ff f5 ff 00 00 00 00 01 f4 07 06 a9 8c ff 00 11 03 e8 00
00 b9 0b ff 00 02 00 01 48 90 00 26 57
48 (SHORT)
3798 03 80 30 00 00 1d 31 f6
1580 03 (SHORT)
17462 02 80 28 00 00 04 75 39 34 0d 3a 07 d3
5778 (SHORT)
34972 03 80 2a 01 00 24 00 15 00 4b 00 01 48 41 19 09 01 00 28 01 37 e5 8c 18
21 10 00 c2 01 01 09 23 00 10 01 00 00 4b d4 72 2b eb 04 ca 20
14542 203 TAG 03 b3 56 ee 2c 90 00 e6 01
197304 05 00 08 39 73
804 33 81 93 bc 3f **FAIL CRC**
Table 2. Example of a M/T trace.
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4.1.4.2. Analysis of the traces collected
It is important to emphasize that the communications of the system analyzed were not
encrypted. Furthermore, it is first necessary to understand ISO/IEC 14443-B to determine the
meaning of the different messages. The following are the steps performed by a regular
ISO/IEC 14443-B system:
1. The tag awaits for a Request Type B(REQB) command.
2. The reader sends the REQB.
3. If the application family identifier (AFI) of the REQB is the one expected, the tag answers
with the ATQB and waits for an ATTRIB command.
4. The reader sends the ATTRIB command.
5. If the ATTRIB command is the one expected, the tag sends the ATA (also known as the
ATATTRIB, answer-to-ATTRIB).
6. Finally, the tag commutes to the active state, where it is able to exchange data commands
with the reader until it receives a DESELECT and commutes to a HALT state.
Regarding the messages transmitted when the tag is in the active state, they can be of three
types: i-block, s-block, and r-block. The first one is used for transmitting and asking for data
from the application layer. The other ones are for protocol operations or are related to data
from lower layers. Table 3 describes the structure of an i-block, which is the only block that
appears in the traces of the communications of the M/T cards.
After analyzing a number of traces, it was concluded that the information contained in the i-
block was compliant with ISO/IEC 7816 [23], which has been massively used in credit, debit,
and other payment cards. Therefore, it is first necessary to describe briefly the structure of the
ISO/IEC 7816 requests and answers.
The typical ISO/IEC 7816 application protocol data unit (APDU) follows the structure shown
in Table 4.
PCB CID NAD Payload  CRC-B
Length 1 byte 1 byte (optional) 1 byte (optional) N bytes 2 bytes
Meaning Protocol control Card ID number Node address (for logic addresses) Cyclic-redundancy check
Table 3. Structure of an i-block.
In Table 4, the CLA byte specifies the command class: in case of being equal to 80 or greater
(except for FF that is not a valid value), it means that proprietary commands are used. The
same happens with the byte INS, which identifies the type of command. The third field on the
header is bytes P1 and P2 that in general, refer to memory positions on the card, but they may
actually be any parameter(PARAM) of the command.
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Field Description Length (bytes)
Header CLA 1
INS 1
P1 and P2 2
Lc Number of bytes transmitted 0, 1 or 3
Data Payload Lc
Le Number of bytes of the response 0–3
Table 4. Structure of an ISO/IEC 7816 APDU command.
Regarding the answers to such commands, they are conformed by two bytes (SW1 and SW2),
which are coded according to Table 5. The most common answer during a correct sequence of
commands is 90-00, but, sometimes, the execution of the sequence can be successful and return
a different value.
4.1.4.3. Disassembling the traces
Once the basics of ISO/IECs 14443-B and 7816 are understood, it is possible to process the traces
generated by the system.
Contrary to what was illustrated in Table 2, the messages “**FAIL CRC**” and “(SHORT)”
should not be present, since they are related to data corruption. In the same way, a good trace
should have alternating messages from the tag and the reader, instead of containing two con-
secutive messages from the same device (except from the case when the reader is looking for
tags). Taking these facts into account, Table 6 indicates the relationship between the standard
SW1–SW2 Meaning
Normal processing 90 00 Ok
Warning processing 61 XX XX bytes are still pending to be sent
62 XX State of nonvolatile memory is unchanged
63 XX State of nonvolatile memory has changed
Execution error 64 XX State of nonvolatile memory is unchanged
65 XX State of nonvolatile memory has changed
66 XX Security-related issues
Checking error 67 00 Wrong length
68 XX Not supported functions in CLA
69 XX Command not allowed
6A XX Wrong P1–P2 parameters
6B 00 Wrong P1–P2 parameters
6C XX Wrong LE field. There are XX bytes available
6D 00 Instruction code not supported or invalid
6E 00 Class not supported
6F 00 No precise diagnosis
Table 5. Common answers to ISO/IEC 7816 commands.
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commands and the trace shown in Table 2. As it can be observed, the sequence of messages is
not correct: some are missing, and others have not been received in the correct order.
First, at timestamp 12350, the reader sends different REQB commands to wake up tags that are
in its surroundings. The first byte of the command is always set to 05, while the second one is
the AFI, that is, equal to 0 (i.e., every tag should respond to the request). The byte PARAM
varies between both commands, being 00 in the first case and 08 in the second one (they are
aimed at waking up tags in different states). Finally, the last two bytes conform the CRC-B
field, which checks the integrity of the message.
The second command is the ATQB:
• It always begins with 50.
• The next four bytes are 08 10 2a 1d, which are the pseudo-unique PICC identifier (PUPI,
which is fixed for each tag of the system analyzed, but it might be random in other systems).
• Then, the command continues with another four bytes (53 4e 44 4b) that indicate the
applications of the tag.
Timestamp RSSI De-
vice 
Payload  Additional
information
Message
0 142 TAG 50 08 10 2a 1d 53 4e 44 4b 33 81 93 bc 3f ATQB
1398 112 TAG 00 78 f0 ATATTRIB
854 05 00 00 71 ff REQB
11500 05 00 00 71 ff REQB
11478 06 00 97 5b
46342 05 00 08 39 73 REQB
1908 1d 08 10 2a 1d 00 08 01 00 94 60 ATTRIB
554 296 TAG 00 78 f0 ATATTRIB
3566 02 80 26 4f 11 0a e7 de i-Block
3146 116 TAG 02 00 14 98 70 10 01 01 76 55 72 90 00 73 65
36188 03 80 32 00 00 18 ea 98
1852 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 ** Fail CRC **
480 00 90 00 1d fe ** Fail CRC **
3676 02 80 2e 01 00 20 43 2f
2870 203 TAG 02 01 01 e0 f5 ff f5 ff 00 00 00 00 01 f4 07 06 a9 8c ff 00 11 03 e8 00
00 b9 0b ff 00 02 00 01 48 90 00 26 57
48 (SHORT)
3798 03 80 30 00 00 1d 31 f6
1580 03 (SHORT)
17462 02 80 28 00 00 04 75 39 34 0d 3a 07 d3
5778 (SHORT)
34972 03 80 2a 01 00 24 00 15 00 4b 00 01 48 41 19 09 01 00 28 01 37 e5
8c 18
21 10 00 c2 01 01 09 23 00 10 01 00 00 4b d4 72 2b eb 04 ca 20
14542 203 TAG 03 b3 56 ee 2c 90 00 e6 01
197304 05 00 08 39 73 REQB
804 33 81 93 bc 3f **FAIL CRC**
Table 6. M/T trace messages analyzed.
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• Next, three bytes (33 81 93) specify different aspects of the communications protocol. Their
description and use are beyond the scope of this chapter, but the interested reader can obtain
such details in ISO/IEC 14443-3.
• The last two bytes contain the CRC-B.
Another imperfect trace is shown in Table 7. However, this trace is useful for illustrating the
sequence of commands executed during the exchange.
After the ATQB, at timestamp 1104, the reader sends the ATTRIB command. The command is
composed by a first byte (1d) that identifies the command, four bytes that indicate the PUPI
from the previous command (08 10 2a 1d), three bytes that determine the communications
protocol, a byte (00, the Card Identifier(CID)) that selects a tag and two final bytes that contain
the CRC-B.
Timestamp RSSI Device Payload  Additional infor-
mation  
Message
0 05 00 00 71 ff REQB
804 138 TAG 50 08 10 2a 1d 53 4e 44 4b 33 81 93 bc 3f ATQB
936 50 08 10 2a 1d 7f cf
464 178 TAG 00 78 f0 ATAT-
TRIB
12350 05 00 00 71 ff REQB
11472 06 00 97 5b
46082 05 00 08 39 73 REQB
804 214 TAG 50 08 10 2a 1d 53 4e 44 4b 33 81 93 bc 3f ATQB
1618 00 00 (SHORT)
3578 02 80 26 4f 11 0a e7 de
3050 02 00 16 98 70 10 01 01 76 55 00 ** FAIL CRC **
8198 03 80 32 00 00 18 ea 98
2334 186 TAG 03 0b 09 87 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 00 1d
ce
3540 02 80 2e 01 00 20 43 2f
1708 02 01 01 e0 f5 ff f5 ff ** FAIL CRC **
1162 275 TAG 02 00 00 b2 90 00 d3 b4 ** FAIL CRC **
3846 03 80 30 00 00 1d 31 f6
2124 (SHORT)
840 93 TAG 04 34 (SHORT)
13524 02 80 28 00 00 04 17 67 7f 16 3a 81 41
6012 230 TAG 02 e7 (SHORT)
33958 03 80 2a 01 00 24 00 17 00 4b 00 00 b2 41 19 09 01 00 28 01 30 ed 8c 17 36 10 00 c2
01 01 09 23 00 10 01 00 00 4b 99 76 da 3b 04 46 49
14544 162 TAG 03 79 a0 ac 57 90 00 1a 0d
218628 05 00 08 39 73
804 138 TAG 50 08 10 2a 1d 53 4e 44 4b 33 81 93 bc 3f
1104 1d 08 10 2a 1d 00 08 01 00 94 60 ATTRIB
554 206 TAG 00 78 f0 ATAT-
TRIB
Table 7. Second example of M/T trace.
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Then, the tag answers with an ATATTRIB command, which consists in 3 bytes: the first one is
the CID (as indicated by the previous command: 00), while the two last bytes are the CRC-B
of the message.
After the ATATTRIB, the RFID session is established and the tag is in the active state, ready
for transmitting data.
After analyzing a great deal of traces of the M/T system, it was found that a sequence of six
pairs of commands was repeated constantly. Since this is just an example of what can be done
with the methodology proposed, we will not deepen into the details, but it will be mentioned
briefly the structure of the first two pairs of commands.
The first command is always the same: “02 80 26 4f 11 0a e7 de.” The standard ISO/IEC 14443-B
indicates that it is an i-block, whose first byte means that it is block number 0 and that it does not
contain CID or NAD. The last two bytes of the message are the CRC-B, so the transmitted data
are composed by five bytes (80 26 4f 11 0a). These bytes follow ISO/IEC 7816: the first one is the
CLA byte (80, proprietary command); the second one is the field INS (26); the third and the
fourth (4f 11) are P1 and P2 (parameters of the command); and the fifth (0a) is the field LE, which
indicates the number of expected bytes to be received from the tag (i.e., 10 bytes are expected).
This first command is followed by the first response of the tag. As it can be observed in
Table 8, it is almost the same for every tag. Its structure is as follows:
• Byte 1 (02): it indicates that it is an i-block 0.
• Bytes 2–13: ISO/IEC 7816 data. For instance, bytes 2–3 indicate the total number of trips
carried out with the card and bytes 12–13 contain the state of the execution of the command
(90-00, successful execution).
• Bytes 14–15: CRC-B.
The second request is also always the same: 03 80 32 00 00 18 ea 98.
• Byte 1 (03): i-block 1.
• Bytes 2–6: ISO/IEC 7816 data. Since CLA is 80, the command is proprietary. INS is equal to
32; P1 and P2 are 00 and 00; and LE (expected length of the answer) is 24 bytes.
• Bytes 7–8: CRC-B.
Trace\#Byte 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Card1-Trace 1 02 00 14 98 70 10 01 01 76 55 72 90 00 73 65
Card1-Trace 2 02 00 15 98 70 10 01 01 76 55 72 90 00 e2 30
Card1-Trace 3 02 00 17 98 70 10 01 01 76 55 72 90 00 c0 9b
Card2-Trace 1 02 01 40 98 70 10 01 02 07 90 31 90 00 65 ac
Card2-Trace 2 02 01 42 98 70 10 01 02 07 90 31 90 00 47 07
Card3-Trace 1 02 00 0c 98 70 20 01 01 69 87 97 90 00 ba 6a
Table 8. Responses collected for the first command.
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The second answer is related to the use of special fares during a trip. Tables 9 and 10 show
examples of traces for different cards. The data are structured as follows:
○ Byte 1 (03): i-block 1.
○ Bytes 2–27: ISO/IEC 7816 data. For instance, bytes 12–13 and 14–15 indicate the activation
and expiration dates of a special fare, and byte 11 the type of fare (e.g., “1” for standard, “3”
for reduced fare).
○ Bytes 28–29: CRC-B.
The rest of the pairs answer-response contain other interesting information such the balance
of the card, the place where the card was recharged (e.g., ATM, bank) or the data about each
trip performed (i.e., cost, date, time, line, and vehicle number).
After all the analysis, it was not found a severe security threat in the system, but there are
several issues regarding data privacy that developers should consider.
The main problem is that the RFID communications are performed in plain text, without any
kind of ciphering, what leads to the possibility of snooping and emulating them. Thanks to
that, an attacker can emulate an unauthorized reader and obtain private data such as the credit
balance or the specific characteristics of the trips of a user. Note also that many smartphones
currently support NFC (near-field communication), which is partially compatible with
ISO/IEC 14443-B tags, and it is straightforward to develop an Android application to read the
data (there have already been attacks to ISO/IEC 14443-A tags using mobile phones [24]).
The complete disassembling of the protocol opens the possibility to perform MitM attacks,
where a third device might alter the data on the RFID transactions in order to get certain
benefits (e.g., for instance, to avoid discounting credit on the card).
Trace\#Byte 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Card 1-Trace 1 03 0b 89 87 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
Card 1-Trace 2 03 0b 89 87 00 00 10 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
Card 2-Trace 1 03 0b 89 87 00 00 10 00 00 00 03 b5 8c f5 8d
Card 3-Trace 1 03 0b 89 87 00 00 20 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00
Table 9. First half of different responses to the second commands.
Trace\#Byte 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Card 1-Trace 1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 00 1d ce
Card 1-Trace 2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 00 1d ce
Card 2-Trace 1 00 10 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 00 a8 0c
Card 3-Trace 1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 00 08 7d
Table 10. Second half of the responses to the second command.
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4.2. Public transportation card of Santiago de Compostela
This RFID card was used until recently in the city of Santiago de Compostela (Spain) to pay
for public transportation.
4.2.1. Visual inspection
Like M/T cards, there is no external sign that identifies the underlying RFID technology. We
can only see the contacts of traditional smart card interfaces, so there are at least two interfaces:
one wired and another wireless.
4.2.2. Operating frequency and modulation
• Operating frequency. Like the previous cards, it is fair to assume that due to its use for public
transportation, there is a high likelihood that it is an HF card. And this fact was confirmed
by following the verification steps described in Section 3.2.1.
• Modulation. Once determined the frequency band, it is possible to test the commands for
the different ISO/IEC standards. After testing, the ones for ISO/IEC 14443-B and ISO/IEC
15693, it was found that the tag responded correctly to ISO/IEC 14443-A commands that
indicated that the tag was a MIFARE Classic 1K.
4.2.3. Understanding the underlying protocols
MIFARE is a contactless smartcard technology from NXP Semiconductors [25] that has sold
more than 5 billion tags and fifty million RFID readers. It started to be manufactured around
1994–1995, being its first major deployment performed in Seoul’s city transportation.
MIFARE is compliant with the first three parts of ISO/IEC 14443-A at 13.56 MHz, although
there are certain differences depending on the version of the tag, which has been evolving
during the last years.
MIFARE Classic is probably the most popular version of MIFARE cards. These tags use a really
simple application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) that basically stores data. Their memory
is divided into sectors and blocks that are protected with a simple access control system. Each
sector is divided into four blocks: three of them contain data, while the other one stores the
data access permissions and the access keys.
There is not a fixed data format, although there is a special format called value block with specif-
ic operations for incrementing and decrementing values. Sectors use two keys (A and B). Each
key allows for managing different permissions: a key could be valid only for reading data,
while the other one could be dedicated to modify them. The first 16 bytes of the internal memo-
ry are read-only and contain the serial number and other data related to the model and the
manufacturer. Data are coded in Crypto-1, an already-broken cryptographic protocol [26–28].
There are different MIFARE Classic versions:
• MIFARE Classic 1K. Its name derives from its 1024-byte internal storage, which is divided
into 16 64-byte sectors.
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• MIFARE Classic 4K. It has 4096 bytes for data divided into 40 sectors.
• MIFARE Classic Mini. It stores 320 bytes in 5 sectors (the actual useful data space is 224
bytes).
After MIFARE Classic, NXP created other versions: Ultralight, Ultralight C, DESFire (whose
security was broken in 2011 [29]), Plus, DESFire V1 and V2, etc.
4.2.4. Security analysis
As it was explained in the previous subsection, MIFARE Classic cards implement a security
system that prevents reading or writing the internal data. However, this system is outdated
and has already been broken.
To get the access keys to read and write the different internal blocks, the Proxmark official
firmware offers several options. For instance, the command hf mf mifare executes the darkside
attack [28] to obtain a valid key. Such an attack usually takes from 30s to half an hour (some-
times it has to be executed several times). An example of the output of the system is shown in
Figure 10, where the A key of the first block is obtained. Then, another attack called “nested
authentication” [30] can be performed: it allows remote attackers to obtain the keys of all the
other blocks (in Figure 11). Once all the keys have been obtained, a dump of the memory can
be extracted.
With the dump, it is possible to study the different parameters (e.g., detect memory changes
as more trips are carried out) or save it to restore it later and recover the previous credit balance.
Figure 10. Obtaining access key A from a MIFARE Classic card with Proxmark.
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Figure 11. Access keys cracked for every sector.
4.3. Animal identification tags
Pet identification has been carried out throughout Europe since the late 1990s. RFID tags are
generally implanted subcutaneously. The main purpose of this identification was animal health
of the most common pets, including cats, dogs, and ferrets (European Regulation 998/2003).
The same system is used in Europe for breeding and production of equidae (European
Regulation 504/2008), and for public health in ovine and caprine animals (European Regulation
21/2004).
4.3.1. Visual inspection
In this case, a visual assessment to detect any sign of the underlying technology is not necessary,
since these kinds of tags are regulated and specified by the different European regulations
previously mentioned.
4.3.2. Detailed analysis
In the case of pet identification, European Regulation 998/2003 specifies that tags have to be
compliant with ISO/IEC 11784 [31] and ISO/IEC 11785 [32]. They both describe LF tags, existing
two different versions: half-duplex (HDX) and full-duplex (FDX and FDX-B). In Spain, most
pets wear FDX-B tags, which use biphasic coding.
• Operating frequency. It was verified with the Proxmark that a sample tag (already
implanted on a dog) was LF, as it was expected from the information given in the previous
section.
• Modulation. In this case, it was not straightforward to recognize the modulation used,
because the signals captured had a lot of noise (the tag had been implanted on the dog a
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year before these tests were performed). An example of the signals received is shown in
Figure 12. It was usually required to filter the signal to reduce the noise, obtaining a figure
like the one shown in Figure 13, which resembles a biphasic coding.
When these experiments were carried out, the official Proxmark firmware did not support
FDX-B, so it was necessary to implement it. Such an implementation first filters and demod-
ulates the signal, and then decodes it.
4.3.3. Understanding the underlying protocols
ISO/IEC 11784 and ISO/IEC 11785 are international standards that regulate RFID for animal
identification. Each animal transponder contains 64 bits with the information shown in
Table 11 (the data values included were generated randomly).
The system works at 134.2 KHz, and there are two different transmission modes: half-duplex
(HDX) and full-duplex (FDX or FDX-B). In HDX mode, the tag is not able to send data and
receive power at the same time. Thus, reading consists in powering the tag for a short interval
and then waiting for the tag to transmit the data. In this mode, an 8-bit header (always
“01111110”) and a 16-bit cyclic-redundancy check (CRC) are sent. An additional chunk of 24
bits is also sent and includes information on the application. Data are modulated in FSK and
coded with non-return-to-zero (NRZ).
Figure 12. Noisy signal from an animal identification tag.
Figure 13. Animal identification tag signal after filtering it.
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The tags that operate in FDX-B mode are able to transmit data and be powered at the same
time. As it can be seen in Table 11, this kind of tags transmits an 11-bit header (“10000000000”),
50 bits of data, 24-bits with the application information and a 16-bit CRC. Moreover, every 8
bits (except for the header) a control bit is added (always “1”). Data are sent in less-significant
bit (LSB) order, so, when the reader receives the bits, it can reconstruct them just using simple
binary shifts. The bits are modulated in Amplitude-Shift Keying(ASK) and are coded in
differential biphase (DBP).
4.3.4. Security evaluation
By making use of the functions implemented, it was straightforward to read data from any
FDX-B tag. The software extracts the two main parameters: the country code and the nation-
al code (the actual identifier). Figure 14 shows an example where two consecutive readings
were performed: the first one is successful, while the second one shows errors related to a
bad reading.
Table 11. Internal memory structure of an animal identification tag.
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Security is almost nonexistent in this kind of tags: although writing is not allowed, the tag
continuously sends the stored data without any authentication requirement. It may seem that
the scenario is not susceptible for including high-security mechanisms, since the objective is
to identify the clinical records and the owner of a dog, but in terms of privacy and uniqueness
of the identifier, the current system is not effective. Note that, using a device such as Proxmark,
it is not only easy to read the data, but also to emulate tags and clone them.
This security problem is even worse when tags are attached to animals aimed at producing
human food (e.g., ovine and caprine animals). Cloning or erasing the data breaks traceability,
which is the way to determine where an epidemic outbreak was originated.
5. Conclusions
The methodology proposed in this chapter for evaluating security in commercial RFID systems
has allowed for detecting relevant flaws in real-world developments, including the following:
• Ability to clone animal identification information.
• Possibility of altering data of certain payment cards.
• Extraction of private information from different transportation cards.
• Possibility of capturing tag-reader communications.
• Possibility of emulating both readers and tags.
Most of the flaws detected were reported to the respective companies, and they have taken the
proper measures to mitigate them: in some cases, the system was redesigned to increase
security, but most companies had to replace the whole hardware with updated and more secure
devices.
Figure 14. Example of readings from an animal identification tag.
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The final conclusion is that although RFID systems can implement sophisticated security
measures, certain developers have adopted the technology without taking such mechanisms
into account. A methodology like the one proposed in this chapter can help to perform au-
dits and determine the security level of an RFID system before taking it from a test environ-
ment to a real situation.
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